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A. The Need to Reverse the Angle 
The overall theme of this volume is the inherent tension between thriving 
for an ever closer union and the presumptive inalienable policy domains of 
Member States. Whereas this take is certainly motivated by the Lisbon 
judgment of the German Bundesverfassungericht,
2
 it fits into a broader 
narrative dominating both the jurisprudence of constitutional courts as 
well scholarly treatises since the ECJ handed down its judgment in Inter-
nationale Handelsgesellschaft in 1970
3
. This narrative is of a European 
integration which poses a threat to national constitutional values, most em-
inently, fundamental rights.
4
 However faded this narrative may have be-
come with the evolution of human rights protection by the ECJ, the be-
nevolent reaction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Wünsche Han-
delsgesellschaft,
5
 and ultimately with the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU gaining the status of a founding treaty with the Treaty of Lis-
bon, it never lost its charm, at least not to high courts all over Europe. This 
is best demonstrated by the series of constitutional challenges to the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant in several jurisdictions,
6
 the most recent being dealt 
with by the ECJ in Melloni.
7
  
 
1  ELTE University Budapest. 
2  Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) – 2BvR 987, 1485, 1099/10 – BverfGE 123, 
p. 267.  
3  ECJ, Case 11/70 – Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECR 1970, 1125. 
4  For an overview see the contributions in: Martinico/Pollicino, The National Judi-
cial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws, 2010. 
5  FCC – 2 BvR 197/83 – BVerfGE 73, p. 339.  
6  See Siegel, Courts and Compliance in the European Union: The European Arrest 
Warrant in National Constitutional Courts, Jean Monnet Working Paper 05/08. 
 
422 
 
The narrative of the European Union as a risk is certainly charged with 
institutional hybris and fear of loss of influence.
8
 Yet as every successful 
and long living frame of understanding certain phenomena it has had solid 
roots in reality. Most importantly, the ECJ has been reluctant to embrace 
the role of a supreme court of a European Union, the core of which is at 
least partly defined by the protection of human rights.
9
 The traditional un-
derstanding of the EU as a functional legal order still transcends the juris-
prudence of the ECJ, and this approach is certainly supported by the lan-
guage of Art. 51(1) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
Yet there is an additional background of viewing EU law as a potential 
threat, and that is the sophisticated system of human rights protection sev-
eral national constitutions and constitutional courts provide. It is not by 
chance that the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and German scholar-
ship has taken the lead role in exposing the possible sources of friction be-
tween national constitutional values and EU law. Against the background 
of a functioning, high level protection of fundamental rights the fear of a 
lowest common denominator at the European level could be very well jus-
tified. 
This paper takes the example of the freedom of the press in Hungary to 
argue that the narrative of EU law as a potential risk should be rethought. 
 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/080501.pdf (last accessed 
28/01/2014); Grasso, The European Arrest Warrant Under the Scrutiny of the 
Italian Constitutional Court, New Journal of European Criminal Law 2013, vol. 
4, p. 120 et seq.; Torres Perrez, Constitutional Dialogue on the European Arrest 
Warrant, EuConst 2012, vol. 8, p. 105 et seq. See also Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, Case 32/2008. (III. 12.) AB, judgment of 12 March 2008, which found the 
international agreement extending the substantvie rules of the European Arrest 
Warrant to Iceland and Norway to be in violation of the nullum crimen principle 
of the Hungarian Constitition and thus indirectly challenging the European Arrest 
Warrant, http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0032_2008.pdf (last accessed 
28/01/2014). 
7  ECJ, Case C-399/11 – Melloni. 
8  See Komarek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, EuConst 2013, vol. 
9, p. 420 et seq. 
9  Von Bogdandy, The European Union as a Human Rights Organisation? Human 
Rights and the Core of the European Union, CML Rev. 2000, p. 1307 (1320 et 
seq.). 
Using this narrow example it is proposed that the possibility of constitu-
tional crises highlights the need to understand EU law as a chance of pre-
serving the core values of every constitution in Europe: democracy, the 
rule of law and respect for fundamental rights. Accordingly, this paper 
will not be concerned with the eventual barriers a national constitution sets 
up in front of European integration. Instead, it will try to explore the pos-
sibilities of setting minimum standards for the media policy of a Member 
State of the EU. In this sense, this essay aims at offering a reverse angle. 
Accordingly, the paper will first outline the sparse elements of the au-
diovisual and media policy of the EU. Secondly, it will briefly summarise 
the issues that arose with the Media Law of Hungary and the reactions of 
the European Union to that. It will be argued that the way the European 
Union handled the case reveals a typical pattern of circumventing Art. 
51(1) of the Charter by recourse to internal market rules. Finally, it is pro-
posed that the Åkerberg Fransson jurisprudence, applied consistently, may 
open a new opportunity to address issues relating, inter alia, to the free-
dom of the press and freedom of expression. 
B. The Sparse Regulatory Framework of the Audiovisual and Media Poli-
cy of the EU 
The regulation of media is primarily a concern for EU law as long as it has 
a link to the internal market. Media as such only appears in Protocol 29 of 
the TEU which addresses the funding of public service broadcasting.
10
 
Accordingly, the regulatory framework of the audiovisual and media poli-
cy of the EU is rather sparse, with the Audiovisual Media Services Di-
rective
11
 at its centre. Beyond that Directive, two recommendations on the 
protection of minors and human dignity
12
 and one on film heritage
13
 are 
 
10  Protocol (29) on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States (OJ 
2012 C 326, p. 312).  
11  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 10/03/2010 
on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or admin-
istrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media 
services (OJ 2010 L 95, p. 1-24). 
12  Council Recommendation 98/560/EC of 24/09/1998 on the development of the 
competitiveness of the European audiovisual and information services industry 
by promoting national frameworks aimed at achieving a comparable and effec-
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listed by the European Commission as parts of the regulatory framework 
of audiovisual and media policy.
14
  
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive, having its roots in the inter-
nal market and being based on Arts. 53(1) and 62 TFEU, is certainly not 
capable of shaping national media policy as such. It is primarily aimed at 
setting up minimum rules and ensuring the country of origin principle, 
however, it may contain important provisions on exclusive rights of 
broadcasting of events that possess major importance for society, 
teleshopping and advertising or the right of reply. What is more, print me-
dia and the freedom of expression in general fall outside of the scope of 
the Directive.  
With this limitation on the policy driven actions of the EU, substantive 
barriers towards Member State actions threatening the freedom of the 
press and the freedom of expression could only be sought in EU funda-
mental rights. The example of Hungary shows, however, that a narrow 
understanding of the competences of the EU in this field produces unsatis-
factory results. 
C. Concerns Relating to the Media in Hungary and the Reactions by Eu-
ropean Institutions 
The 2010 elections in Hungary resulted in a landslide victory for a single 
party (Fidesz). Possessing more than two-thirds of the votes in Parliament, 
the governing party gained a legally unlimited power to amend the consti-
tution and to reshape the legal order of Hungary. Although issues that 
 
tive level of protection of minors and human dignity (OJ 1998 L 270, p. 48-55); 
Recommendation 2006/952/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
20/12/2006 on the protection of minors and human dignity and on the right of re-
ply in relation to the competitiveness of the European audiovisual and on-line in-
formation services industry (OJ 2006 L 378, p. 72-77). 
13  Recommendation 2005/865/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 
16/11/2005 on film heritage and the competitiveness of related industrial activi-
ties (OJ 2005 L 323, p. 57-61). 
14  http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/reg/index_en.htm (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
arose herefrom are many, I am focusing on those questions relating to the 
media that provoked reactions by the European Commission. 
One of the first steps of reshaping the legal landscape in Hungary was 
to adopt new laws on print and electronic media: Act CIV of 9 November 
2010 on the freedom of the press and the fundamental rules on media con-
tent (Press Freedom Act)
15
 and Act CLXXXV of 30 December 2010 on 
media services and on the mass media (Mass Media Act). These laws 
raised a number of grave concerns from the perspective of the freedom of 
the press.
16
 To name a few, the new regulation provided for an obligation 
to register for all media, including print, electronic and online media;
17
 it 
obliged all media to provide balanced coverage;
18
 it contained general, 
broadly framed content based prohibitions for all media to protect vaguely 
defined concepts as human dignity,
19
 human rights and privacy;
20
 it re-
duced significantly the protection for sources of information; created the 
position of a Media Ombudsman giving it vaguely defined sanctioning 
powers and it authorised the newly created National Media and Infocom-
munications Authority to impose severe sanctions.
21
 The President of the 
National Media and Infocommunications Authority was to be appointed 
for the unusually long term of nine years (more than two legislative peri-
ods) by the President of the Republic.
22
  
It is by no surprise that the European Commission reacted quickly and 
strongly to the new legislation.
23
 Already on 23 December 2010 Neelie 
 
15  For an English translation of the original text see 
http://cmcs.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/domain-69/cmcs-
archive/act_civ_media_content.pdf (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
16   For a critical appraisal see Polyák, Context, rules and practice of the new Hun-
garian Media Law – How does the Media Law affect the structure and the func-
tioning of publicity in: von Bogdandy/Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in 
the European Constitutional Area, Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Ro-
mania (forthcoming in 2014). 
17  Sec. 41(4) Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010. 
18  Sec. 13 Press Freedom Act and Sec. 12(1) Mass Media Act as of 31 December 
2010. 
19  On this specific aspect see Koltay, The Protection of Human Dignity in Hungari-
an Media Regulation, German Law Journal 2013, vol. 14, no. 7, p. 823 et seq. 
20  Part Two Chapter I Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010. 
21  Secs. 185-187 Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010. 
22  Sec. 111/A.(1) Mass Media Act. 
23 For a highly informative collection of relevant documents see 
https://cmcs.ceu.hu/node/26249#euro (last accessed 28/01/2014). See also Hoff-
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Kroes, vice-president of the European Commission, addressed her Hun-
garian counterpart in a letter, stating her concerns in general terms.
24
 This 
letter was followed by a more detailed one on 21 January 2011
25
 requiring 
clarifications of three issues. These included the obligation to provide bal-
anced coverage applicable to all audiovisual media service providers on 
the basis of Sec. 13 Press Freedom Act and Sec. 12(1) Mass Media Act, 
the power of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority to 
impose fines and other sanctions on media service providers established in 
other Member States of the EU on the basis of Sec. 176 ad 177 Mass Me-
dia Act, as well as the requirement in Sec. 41 Mass Media Act that all me-
dia, in particular press and online media, be registered. The Commission 
and the Hungarian authorities thereafter held meetings in Brussels at ex-
pert level between 7th February and 15th February. The Hungarian side 
gave in rapidly to all points raised by the Commission. Although the 
amending legislation was only adopted on 7 March and published in the 
Official Gazette on 22 March 2011,
26
 Commission Vice-President Kroes 
welcomed the planned amendments to the Hungarian Media Law in a 
 
meister, Enforcing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in Member States – 
how far are Rome, Budapest and Bucharest from Brussels?, in: von Bog-
dandy/Sonnevend, (fn. 16). 
24  http://www.kormany.hu./download/8/01/10000/kroes.pdf (last accessed 
28/01/2014). According to the letter: “Independent regulatory authorities for the 
broadcasting sector have an important role to play to ensure the existence of a 
wide range of independent and autonomous media. Concerns have been ex-
pressed by numerous commentators that the recently adopted Media Act risks 
jeopardising the rights by giving very broad competences to the Media Athority. 
These same commentators also allege that the composition of the Media Authori-
ty does not seem to guarantee its independence. In addition, doubts have been 
raised about some of the provisons of the Act which apparently are applicable to 
broadcasters established in other Member States, which raises potential questions 
of coherence with one of the basic principles of the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive.” 
25  http://cmcs.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/domain-69/cmcs-
archive/EC_lettertoHungary_2011Jan21.pdf (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
26  A sajtószabadságról és a médiatartalmak alapvető szabályairól szóló 2010. évi 
CIV. törvény és a médiaszolgáltatásokról és a tömegkommunikációról szóló 
2010. évi CLXXXV. törvény módosításáról szóló 2011. évi XIX. törvény. 
press release already on 16 February.
27
 The amendments agreed included 
the following: 
limitation of the balanced coverage requirements to broadcasting, these 
no longer apply to on-demand media services;  
broadcasters and other audiovisual media service providers legally es-
tablished and authorised in other Member States can no longer be fined for 
breaching the Hungarian Media Law's provisions on incitement to hatred; 
on-demand audiovisual media service providers, media product pub-
lishers and ancillary media service providers established in Hungary and 
in other Member States are no longer subject to prior authorisation by the 
Hungarian authorities; 
the prohibition not to cause offence to individuals, minorities or majori-
ties is limited to situations of incitement to hatred or discrimination. 
Notably, these amendments did not address many general concerns re-
lating to the freedom of the press and focused on those aspects that had a 
direct link to European Union law – an aspect that will be dealt with be-
low. 
It was not until 17 January 2012 that the European Commission ad-
dressed again the Hungarian Government in a letter. In that letter, Com-
mission Vice-President Kroes raised, inter alia, the issue of a radio station 
known for its stark critical stance towards the government (named: 
Klubrádió) that – after operating successfully for a long time – was bid-
ding unsuccessfully for a renewed radio licence. Vice-President Kroes 
noted that there were “widespread expressions of concern about the effect 
of this decision on the overall objective of a free and pluralist media land-
scape, in particular as regards the range of political commentary in broad-
cast media”.
28
 These concerns remained unanswered by the Hungarian 
Government, yet the European Commission did not follow up on the is-
sue. 
It is important to note that none of the above instances of intervention 
by the European Commission ever came close to an infringement proce-
dure. The modest attempts of the European Commission to influence the 
fate of media freedom in Hungary are in strong contrast with domestic ju-
 
27  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-89_en.htm (last accessed 
28/01/2014). 
28  http://blogs.r.ftdata.co.uk/brusselsblog/files/2012/01/KroesHungaryLettter1.pdf 
(last accessed 28/01/2014). 
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dicial decisions and also with a broad protest articulated by European in-
stitutions in and outside of the European Union. 
From amongst the domestic reactions, most important was the Constitu-
tional Court’s, which found in its Decision Nr. 165/2011. (XII. 20.) AB 
that many of the provisions of the Press Freedom Act and the Mass Media 
Act were unconstitutional.
29
 The Decision struck down, inter alia, the 
provision in the Press Freedom Act which extended the scope of the Act to 
the print media, thereby eliminating the content based limitations relating 
to it; obliged Parliament to provide for an appropriate protection of 
sources in all relevant laws; and in general annulled the entire section on 
the Media Ombudsman. Even if this Decision left the institutional struc-
ture envisaged by the legislation almost untouched, it could address many 
of the concerns that remained after the intervention of the European 
Commission. 
In the case of the licenses of Klubrádió, the Budapest appeals court 
handed down four consecutive judgments in favour of Klubrádió. After 
the fourth ruling the Media Council finally awarded a frequency in March 
2013, almost three years after the license to a frequency was declined. It 
seems, again, that there were legitimate concerns that could not be re-
solved by an intervention of the European Commission. 
Not only domestic courts exposed problems related to the freedom of 
the press. The European Parliament has repeatedly drawn attention to the 
situation of the media in Hungary.
30
 Most importantly, a resolution of the 
European Parliament on 10 March 2011 deplored the Commission's deci-
sion to target only three points in connection with the implementation of 
the acquis communautaire by Hungary and called on the Commission to 
continue the close monitoring and assessment of the conformity of Hun-
 
29  165/2011. (XII. 20.) AB, ABH 2011, p. 478 et seq. For an English summary see 
http://hunmedialaw.org/dokumentum/94/08_1652011_Abh_final.pdf (last ac-
cessed 28/01/2014). 
30  For an exquisite overview see https://cmcs.ceu.hu/node/26249#euro (last ac-
cessed 28/01/2014). 
garian media law in accordance with European legislation, particularly 
with the Charter on Fundamental Rights.
31
 
Outside of the European Union, the OSCE Representative on Freedom 
of the Media condemned the Hungarian legislation on more than one oc-
casion
32
, as endangering media freedom and, if misused, threatening to 
silence critical media and public debate in the country.
33
 The OSCE Rep-
resentative maintained her concerns even subsequent to the amendments 
to the relevant legislation that Hungary had agreed upon with the Europe-
an Commission.
34
 In a similar vein, the Council of Europe’s Commission-
er for Human Rights issued an opinion on 25 February 2011, concluding 
that the wide range of problematic provisions in Hungary’s media legisla-
tion were sufficient to warrant a wholesale review of the “media package”. 
It recommended that “the goals of such a review include the reinstatement 
of precise legislation promoting pluralistic and independent media, and the 
strengthening of guarantees of immunity from political influence on the 
part of the media regulatory mechanisms”.
35
 The Council of Europe also 
set up an expert body to assess the Hungarian media legislation. The ex-
pert body delivered its report on 11 May 2012
36
, which contained 61 rec-
ommendations on how to harmonise the Hungarian media laws with Eu-
 
31  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-
TA-2011-0094+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
32  For an overview, again, see https://cmcs.ceu.hu/node/26249#euro (last accessed 
28/01/2014). 
33  Press release, Hungarian media law further endangers media freedom, says 
OSCE media freedom representative. http://www.osce.org/fom/74687 (last ac-
cessed 28/01/2014). 
34  Despite adjustments, Hungary's media law continues to violate OSCE commit-
ments, says OSCE representative on freedom of the media. 
http://www.osce.org/fom/75999 (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
35  Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights on Hungary’s media legislation 
in light of Council of Europe standards on freedom of the media, Strasbourg, 25 
February 2011, CommDH(2011)10, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1751289 (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
36  Council of Europe Secretariat-General, Directorate General Human Rights and 
Rule of Law, Expertise by Council of Europe experts on Hungarian Media Legis-
lation: Act CIV of 2010 on the freedom of the press and the fundamental rules on 
media content and Act CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and mass media, 
Strasburg, 11 May 2012; 
http://hub.coe.int/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=fbc88585-eb71-4545-bc5d-
b727e35f59ae&groupId=10227 (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
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ropean standards and the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights.
37
 
D. Trapped by the Competence Problem  
How, one might ask, could the European Union have achieved so little in a 
matter so grave and so obvious for domestic and European institutions? 
The answer is naturally clear and lies in a traditional understanding of Eu-
ropean Union law as the law of the internal market. It is noted that the 
communication of Commission Vice-President Kroes with Hungary uses 
arguments based on the internal market to address restrictions on media 
freedom.
38
 The reason for that seems to be clear: the European Commis-
sion could only rely on the Audiovisual Media Services Directive to sup-
port its case and the Directive is limited to the issues that were actually 
raised by the Commission. Yet a closer look at the different letters of the 
Commission Vice-President reveals that this was not a complete necessity. 
In her first relevant letter of 23 December 2010, Vice-President Kroes 
seemed to take a broader approach which would have warranted the exam-
ination of the Hungarian legislation on the basis of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. First, the letter expressed the understanding that the media 
legislation “primarily aims to transpose the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive (Directive 2010/13/EU)”. It then continued by stating that “[t]he 
freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of our 
democratic societies[…]. Media pluralism, freedom of expression and 
press freedom are underlying elements of European democracy guaranteed 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.”
39
 This opening could be under-
stood as paving the way for the application of Art. 51(1) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights inasmuch as it referred to the Hungarian legislation as 
an implementation of EU law. 
 
37  For a summary see Hoffmeister, (fn. 23). 
38  Dawson/Muir, Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights 
and the Rule of Law, German Law Journal 2013, vol. 14, p. 1959 (1968 et seq.). 
39  http://www.kormany.hu./download/8/01/10000/kroes.pdf (last accessed 
28/01/2014). 
In contrast, the following letter of 21 January 2011 took a narrow ap-
proach and only relied on specific provisions of the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive as well as on the freedom of establishment and the free 
provision of services guaranteed by Arts. 49 and 56 TFEU.
40
 This letter 
made no mention of the Charter of Fundamental Rights whatsoever. The 
letter that addressed licensing of Klubrádió is not different in this respect, 
even if there, Vice-President Kroes expressed general concerns about the 
media in Hungary.
41
 
It is submitted that this traditional, narrow approach is not unique. On 
the contrary, it is in harmony with the other cases where the European 
Commission attempted to intervene with undesired constitutional devel-
opments in Hungary by means of an infringement procedure.  
The issues addressed by the Commission were the sudden reduction of 
the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62, the removal of the Data Protec-
tion Commissioner and the independence of the Central Bank. First, in a 
letter dated 12 December 2011,
42
 Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the 
European Commission, raised the issues of the judiciary and the Data Pro-
tection Commissioner. Shortly thereafter, in a letter that was leaked to the 
press, the President of the European Commission “strongly advised” the 
Hungarian Prime Minister to withdraw the Bills of two cardinal laws on 
the Hungarian Central Bank and on financial stability from Parliament be-
cause of their incompatibility with European Union law. Consequently, on 
17 January, three Letters of Formal Notice were sent to Hungary as the 
first stage in the infringement procedure. The letters concerned the inde-
pendence of the central bank and data protection authorities and the forced 
retirement of judges above a certain age.
43
 Ultimately, the latter two issues 
were pursued and submitted to the ECJ. 
 
40  http://cmcs.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/domain-69/cmcs-
archive/EC_lettertoHungary_2011Jan21.pdf (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
41  http://blogs.r.ftdata.co.uk/brusselsblog/files/2012/01/KroesHungaryLettter1.pdf 
(last accessed 28/01/2014). 
42  www.kormany.hu/download/4/8b/60000/Letter%20from%20Vice-
President%20Viviane%20Reding%20to%20Vice-
Prime%20Minister%20Tibor%20Navracsics.pdf (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
43  European Commission, Press release, European Commission launches accelerat-
ed infringement proceedings against Hungary over the independence of its cen-
tral bank and data protection authorities as well as over measures affecting the 
judiciary, Strasbourg, 17 Jan. 2012, www.europa. 
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/24 (last accessed 28/01/2014). 
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The independence of the data protection supervisory authority was seen 
as to have been breached because the six-year term of the incumbent Data 
Protection Commissioner was prematurely brought to an end by constitu-
tional provisions that created a new National Agency for Data Protection 
to replace the current Data Protection Commissioner’s Office as of 1 Jan-
uary 2012. The action brought on 8 June 2012 by the European Commis-
sion relied on Art. 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of indi-
viduals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, arguing that the removal from office before time 
of the authority responsible for supervising data protection undermined the 
independence of that authority required by the Directive.
44
 The opinion of 
Advocate General Wathelet of 10 December 2013 agreed with the Com-
mission and found a violation of Art. 28 of the Directive.
45
 It is remarka-
ble, that the central concern of the opinion of the Advocate General is 
whether the previous Data Protection Commissioner could have been ap-
pointed to lead the new National Agency for Data Protection. This entails 
the assumption that the abolition of the previous Data Protection Commis-
sioner’s Office would be acceptable from the perspective of EU law, if the 
previous Commissioner had been elected to lead the newly created author-
ity. This indicates, that the case is orchestrated as a matter of the personal 
fate of the previous Commissioner, and not as a matter of principle. 
Similarly, the lowering of the mandatory retirement age of judges from 
70 to 62 was not addressed by the European Commission as an obvious 
matter of the independence of the judiciary, but as discrimination at the 
workplace on grounds of age in the light of the rules on equal treatment in 
employment (Directive 2000/78/EC). The ECJ acceded to the position of 
the European Commission and ruled on 6 November 2012 that the rele-
vant national legislation gave rise to a difference in treatment on grounds 
of age which was neither appropriate nor necessary to attain the objectives 
pursued and therefore did not comply with the principle of proportionality. 
 
44  ECJ, Case C-288/12, Action brought on 8 June 2012 – European Commission v 
Hungary (OJ 2012 C 227, p. 15-16). 
45  ECJ, Case C-288/12, (fn. 44), Opinion of AG Wathelet of 10/12/2013, para 82. 
Thus, according to the ruling, Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations 
under Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
46
 
At the time of writing this paper, these two instances are the only in-
fringement procedures initiated against Hungary for concerns relating to 
the values listed in Art. 2 TEU. They show a pattern similar to the one fol-
lowed in the case of the Hungarian media legislation which can be best 
characterised by recourse to narrow internal market related provisions and 
by strictly avoiding the conflicts that may arise from the application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights to a Member State.
47
  
 
E. Revisiting Art. 51(1) European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The above case study clearly demonstrates that the competence problem 
and the resulting indirect protection of fundamental rights is anything but 
satisfactory. This warrants the question whether there are alternative ways 
to ensure respect for the fundamental values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU by 
the Member States. 
The founding treaties of the EU are rather ambiguous as to how the EU 
shall address disrespect for the foundational values of Art. 2 TEU by the 
Member States.
48
 Prima facie it can be argued that besides the “nuclear 
option” of Art. 7 TEU there are no appropriate means to address such con-
cerns.  
A tempting and innovative proposal would tackle this problem and uti-
lise the Ruiz Zambrano ruling of the ECJ
49
 to enable domestic courts to 
ask for a preliminary ruling on the basis of Art. 2 TEU if it cannot be pre-
sumed that the Member State in question ensures the essence of funda-
mental rights enshrined in Art. 2 TEU.
50
  
 
46  ECJ, Case C-286/12 – Commission v Hungary. 
47  Dawson/Muir, (fn. 38), p. 1974. 
48  Dawson/Muir, (fn. 38), p. 1959. 
49  ECJ, Case C-34/09 – Ruiz Zambrano v. Office National de L’emploi, ECR 2011, 
I-01177. 
50  Von Bogdandy, Reverse Solange–Protecting the essence of fundamental rights 
against EU Member States, Common Market Law Review 2012, vol. 49, issue 2, 
p. 489-519. 
434 
 
It is submitted that, ultimately, it is not unproblematic to yield to the 
tempting vision of a competence-wise unlimited – yet minimum – protec-
tion by EU law against Member State actions. The basic question is the 
relationship between the Charter and the provision of Art. 2 TEU which 
declares respect for human rights to be a foundational value of the EU 
common to the Member States. The reverse Solange proposal suggests 
that the difference between the two is in the level of protection. Accord-
ingly, the Charter contains the full acquis of EU fundamental rights, 
whereas Art. 2 TEU aims at safeguarding essentials. The essence to be 
protected under Art. 2 TEU should be identical to the essence of funda-
mental rights which is also protected by Art. 52(1) of the Charter and 
Member States constitutions.  
This is the point, however, where difficulties arise: if the Charter itself 
contains an essence guarantee – which it does in Art. 52(1) –, then this is 
also subject to the limitation of Art. 51(1) of the Charter. In other words, 
Member States are bound under Art. 51(1) of the Charter to respect even 
the essence of fundamental rights only inasmuch as they are implementing 
EU law. Assuming that Art. 2 TEU does not lift the limitation of Art. 
51(1) of the Charter, it occurs that the difference between the Charter on 
the one hand and Art. 2 TEU on the other is not in the level, but in the na-
ture of the protection. The Charter shall function as the foundation of judi-
cial enforcement of fundamental rights, and Art. 2 TEU as the basis of po-
litical decision-making under Art. 7 TEU.  
Besides, a reference to the practical value of the reverse Solange pro-
posal is needed. The essence guarantee has a symbolic role expressing that 
certain values are beyond reach of the State. But it is extraordinarily diffi-
cult for a Member State court to utilise this test as the single tool under EU 
law in cases where Art. 51(1) of the Charter seemingly prevents recourse 
to the full guarantees of the Charter. This difficulty seems to be even 
greater in countries where courts would actually need this tool because of 
highly problematic statutes: a political climate which allows the adoption 
of such laws definitely requires clear cut and obvious tests so that the 
courts do not have to fear public criticism. Unfortunately, the essence 
guarantee does not seem to offer such a practical toolkit. 
It is submitted, therefore, that Art. 51(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is insurmountable and the success of the European Union in maintaining 
its values listed in Art. 2 TEU will depend on the interpretation of Art. 
51(1) of the Charter. In this respect, the ruling of the ECJ in the Åkerberg 
Fransson case
51
 seems to offer a promising opportunity. The concluding 
part of this paper will therefore devote attention to the potential of this rul-
ing. 
F. Åkerberg Fransson – Promising Continuity 
Åkerberg Fransson attracted wide attention in academia,
52
 and the reac-
tion is not completely positive. Åkerberg Fransson is said to be based on a 
too far-reaching understanding of the ECJ’s competences, creating the 
power to apply EU fundamental rights in a potentially wide range of cases 
not covered by the language of Art. 51(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
What is more, it is argued that the inversion of the rule that primarily the 
Member States themselves are responsible for fundamental rights protec-
tion would engender the danger that fundamental rights protection be-
comes dissociated from the still primarily national societies in which it has 
to function. Also, the domestic separation of powers is seen as endangered 
as, so it is claimed, dislocating fundamental rights protection from the na-
tional arena may undermine and erode the functioning of these courts in 
the national constitutional spheres.
53
  
More striking than that, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht reacted 
promptly and harshly to Åkerberg Fransson in a judgment concerning a 
counter-terrorism database.
54
 The language of the press release to the 
judgment is especially surprising:  
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ter für einen effektiven Grundrechtsschutz in der EU?,  ZEuS 2013, vol. 16, p. 
239 et seq. 
53  Editorial Comment, (fn. 52), p. 171. 
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“As part of a cooperative relationship, this decision must not be read in 
a way that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endan-
gered the protection and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the 
Member States in a way that questioned the identity of the Basic Law’s 
constitutional order. The Senate acts on the assumption that the statements 
in the ECJ’s decision are based on the distinctive features of the law on 
value-added tax, and express no general view.”
55
 
This reaction by the Bundesverfassungsgericht can be best understood 
as defending the separation of the roles of fundamental rights protection 
between national and European instances.
56
 It is argued convincingly that 
the “separation thesis” propagated by Karlsruhe tries to uphold, for the 
time being, the status quo ante in the area of fundamental rights protection 
in Europe.
57
 
It is submitted that the critical reactions of academia and of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht overstate the novel nature of the reasoning in Åker-
berg Fransson, at least as regards the abstract interpretation of Art. 51(1) 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is because the central thesis of the 
ruling is nothing but the revitalisation of a jurisprudence more than two 
decades old. Reading para 19 of the ruling makes this abundantly clear: 
“In this respect the Court has already observed that it has no power to 
examine the compatibility with the Charter of national legislation lying 
outside the scope of European Union law. On the other hand, if such legis-
lation falls within the scope of European Union law, the Court, when re-
quested to give a preliminary ruling, must provide all the guidance as to 
interpretation needed in order for the national court to determine whether 
that legislation is compatible with the fundamental rights the observance 
of which the Court ensures.”
58
 
 
omy and the Charter? Diverging Visions of the German Constitutional Court and 
the European Court of Justice, EuConst 2013, vol. 9, p. 391-419. 
55  For the press release on the judgement (fn. 54) in English language (press release 
no. 31/2013 of 24 April 2013) see 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg13-031en.html 
(last accessed 28/01/2014). 
56  Thym, (fn. 54), p. 404 et seq. 
57  Ibid., p. 407. 
58  ECJ, Case C-617/10, (fn. 51), para 19. 
In fact, the famous ETR ruling quoted here by the ECJ used almost lit-
erally the same language twenty two years before Åkerberg Fransson was 
handed down.
59
 The “coup” of the ECJ in Åkerberg Fransson therefore 
consists in nothing else but interpreting the term in Art. 51(1) Charter of 
Fundamental Rights “implementing EU law” as confirming the previous 
relevant jurisprudence of the ECJ.
60
 Åkerberg Fransson is thus the contin-
uation of a jurisprudence that is several decades old and by far no revolu-
tionary step. 
This leads to the central question of the present paper, whether the in-
herent tension between Art. 2 TEU on the one hand and Art. 51(1) Charter 
of Fundamental Rights on the other can be mitigated by a broader inter-
pretation of Art. 51(1) of Charter. The language of Åkerberg Fransson ac-
cording to which a Member State action has to be within the scope of Eu-
ropean Union law in order to trigger the application of the Charter seems 
promising in this respect. Yet this language is also open to interpretation, 
and the existing case law is still ambiguous. 
In Åkerberg Fransson the Commission, the Advocate-General and vari-
ous national governments had rejected the applicability of the Charter be-
cause of the high level of abstraction of common rules for value added 
tax.
61
 Even the Court admitted that the Charter applied even though the 
national Swedish rule “has not been adopted to transpose” Directive 
2006/112/EC.
62
 On the other hand, the Court noted that the application of 
the national legislation was designed to penalise an infringement of the 
Directive and was therefore intended to implement the obligation imposed 
 
59  ECJ, Case C‑260/89 – Elliniki Radiophonia, ECR 1991, I‑2925 para 42: “As the 
Court has held […] it has no power to examine the compatibility with the Euro-
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on the Member States by the Treaty to impose effective penalties for con-
duct prejudicial to the financial interests of the European Union.
63
 
In Texdata
64
, confirming Åkerberg Fransson, the ECJ followed a simi-
lar logic inasmuch as it decided in favour of the applicability of the princi-
ples of effective judicial protection and respect for the rights of the de-
fence as enshrined by the Charter because the main proceedings concerned 
the penalty imposed for failure to comply with disclosure obligations fore-
seen by a company law directive of the Council.
65
  
This jurisprudence certainly offers a relatively broad interpretation of 
the term “falling within the scope of EU law”. The remaining question is 
to what extent can it be utilised in explosive cases involving possible vio-
lations of fundamental values of the EU by a Member State. A recent ex-
ample is less encouraging in this respect. A Hungarian Court requested a 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the question of whether dismissal 
from public service without any reasons constitutes a violation of Art. 30 
Charter of Fundamental Rights providing for protection against unjustified 
dismissals.
66
 This request was peculiar in the sense that previously both 
the European Court of Human Rights
67
 and the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court
68
 found the respective Hungarian legislation (which was enacted in 
2010) to be in violation of the fair trial guarantees of Art. 6(1) European 
Convention on Human Rights and the Hungarian Constitution, respective-
ly. In contrast, the ECJ was reluctant to take up the case and ruled in Oc-
tober 2013 – explicitly quoting Åkerberg Fransson – that the case did not 
in any fashion fall within the scope of EU law.
69
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Here, it would have been perfectly legitimate to argue – as already the 
President of the Republic of Hungary had argued against the adoption of 
the relevant law in 2010
70
 – that the obligation to give reasons for a dis-
missal is inevitable to make the complete anti-discrimination law of the 
EU effective in the domestic jurisdiction. In other words, legal provisions 
providing for the obligation to give reasons for a dismissal are implement-
ing the anti-discrimination directives. Apparently, the ECJ was not ready 
to go down that road. 
G. Conclusion 
The example of the treatment of Hungarian media laws by the European 
Union reveals that the traditional narrow understanding of EU law as the 
law of the internal market can no longer ensure respect for the fundamen-
tal values of the EU as enshrined in Art. 2 TEU. The language of Art. 
51(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights is certainly an obstacle in the way of 
enforcing such respect. Yet the recent Åkerberg Fransson jurisprudence 
offers a chance to address issues as to the status quo of democracy, the 
rule of law and fundamental rights in Member States and in a more com-
prehensive fashion. This shall not be seen as a threat to functioning consti-
tutional democracies in the EU, nor to the activity of constitutional courts. 
Rather, a broad interpretation of Art. 51(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights 
can make the proclamation of the values of the EU in Art. 2 TEU credible 
and may ensure homogeneity within the European Union in this pivotal 
respect. The Hungarian experience shows that it is time to grasp EU law 
as a chance for fundamental constitutional values. 
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